Adapted from a book in progress on AI, crypto, and the machine-readable company.
I learned this lesson twice.
The first time was in the late 1990s, when I was a young management consultant working on restructuring projects around Al Dunlap, the executive known as Chainsaw Al. In those rooms, business process reengineering was often presented as hard-headed managerial truth. Strip out layers. Eliminate overlap. Move faster. Cut deep enough and the company would come back stronger.
The second time was decades later, as CEO of Blockdaemon, sitting across from institutional customers who did not care how our company was organized internally. They did not care which team owned which product. They did not care whether a problem sat with engineering, product, security, delivery, or operations.
They wanted one answer to one question:
If we trust you with critical infrastructure, who owns the outcome?
That question gets to the heart of how companies actually work.
Customers experience the company as one thing. Management rarely does.
Inside a company, the work may cross multiple teams, systems, reporting lines, and planning cycles before the customer sees the outcome. Each function may be doing sensible work. Each leader may be acting rationally. Each team may be optimized for its own metric. And still the experience can feel fragmented, slow, and brittle because the customer does not buy your internal complexity. They buy the total flow.
That was the core insight behind business process reengineering in the 1990s, and it was a good one. The unit of analysis should not be the department. It should be the end-to-end flow of value. How does customer demand become delivery? Where do decisions stall? Where does information degrade? Where do accountability and ownership blur?
That idea was right.
What went wrong was what companies did with it.
Too often, “reengineering” became a nicer word for mass layoffs, centralization, and short-term financial optics. The language sounded rigorous. Processes would be streamlined. Redundancies would be eliminated. The company would become more focused and efficient. Sometimes the numbers improved just long enough to keep the story alive.
But in many cases, what was called reengineering was not a redesign of the operating system. It was an extraction event. Capability left with the people who were cut. Judgment left with them too. The company looked leaner while becoming weaker.
I saw enough of that firsthand to know how easily a valid management idea can be weaponized.
That is why the AI moment feels familiar.
Today, executives say they want to use AI to make their organizations faster, leaner, and more productive. Fine. Some of that is real. But too much of what passes for AI strategy already sounds like the old reengineering misuse in a new accent.
The first question is often not, “How should work be redesigned?”
It is, “How many people can this replace?”
The first instinct is not to clarify ownership, improve system state, or remove bad handoffs. It is to drop a model on top of a messy operating environment and hope efficiency falls out.
That is the same mistake.
You cannot get the benefits of redesign by skipping the redesign.
This is one reason Blockdaemon has been such a useful lens for me. In a business like ours, fiction gets punished quickly. We serve institutions that expect reliability, accountability, and operational clarity. We operate across infrastructure, security, delivery, and commercial commitments. If the company is fuzzy about who owns what, where truth lives, or how issues move from signal to action, the problem does not stay theoretical. It turns into delay, risk, and lost trust.
That environment exposes a hard truth:
The org chart is an internal convenience. It is not a customer-facing design.
Institutions do not want to buy your internal seams. They want one commercial posture, one security story, one delivery path, and one answer when something matters. They want a coherent surface.
And now AI raises the stakes.
The problem with AI in most enterprises is not that the models are weak. The problem is that the company itself is illegible. Work lives in too many places. Decisions are trapped in meetings. Exceptions live in side channels. Ownership is assumed rather than stated. Systems disagree with each other. The company has an official process, a workaround, and an emergency path everybody relies on when the official process breaks.
Then leadership adds AI and asks for leverage.
Leverage over what?
If the company cannot clearly tell a machine what is happening, the machine will infer, smooth, and guess. Sometimes it will even sound persuasive while doing it. That is why so much enterprise AI feels polished and hollow at the same time. The outputs are cleaner. The underlying operating state is still a mess.
This is the real sequel to 1990s business process reengineering.
Back then, the question was whether companies could redesign work around outcomes instead of departments.
Today, the question is whether companies can redesign work so machines can participate in it without making the business more brittle, more centralized, or more detached from reality.
That changes the standard.
It is not enough to have a process. The process has to be legible.
It is not enough to have ownership. Ownership has to be explicit.
It is not enough to have systems of record. They have to contain enough truth that humans and machines can act from them without inventing the missing pieces.
Most companies are not there yet.
That is not an AI problem. It is an operating model problem.
And it is why I keep coming back to one line:
Do not automate the mess. Rewrite the mess.
That is the real task.
The companies that win in the AI era will not be the ones that adopted the most tools first. They will be the ones that used this moment to make work legible, decisions durable, ownership explicit, and trust portable.
I saw what happened in the 1990s when a real management idea got turned into a body-count strategy. We should be honest that the same temptation is back. The language of efficiency is back. The pressure to centralize is back. The temptation to confuse cost reduction with redesign is back.
The difference is that this time the technology is real.
Which means the upside is real too, if companies are willing to do the harder thing first.
Not automate confusion.
Redesign the company so intelligence can actually help.
